Pervasive Social Networking (PSN) intends to support instant social activities in a pervasive way at any time and anywhere. In order to protect crucial social activities, ensure communication dependability, and enhance user privacy, securing pervasive social communications becomes especially important. However, neither centralized nor distributed solutions can protect PSN communications as expected. How to automatically control data access in a trustworthy and efficient way is an important security issue. In this article, we propose a scheme to guarantee communication data security in PSN based on two dimensions of trust in a flexible manner on the basis of Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE). Its advantages and performance are justified and evaluated through extensive analysis on security, computation complexity, communication cost, scalability, and flexibility, as well as scheme implementation. In addition, we develop a demo system based on Android mobile devices to test our scheme in practice. The results demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness. Comparison with our previous work based on CP-ABE (Yan and Wang 2017) further shows its feasibility to be applied to PSN.
Securing Communication Data in PSN Based on Trust with KP-ABE 9:3 manner on the basis of Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE). GT is evaluated by a Trusted Server (TS) based on historically accumulated social networking information; LT is evaluated by PSN nodes based on locally collected information in social interactions. GT is more accurate than LT since it is evaluated based on globally collected information linked to a unique node identifier. It is used for PSN data access control when the TS is available. The TS generates public key PK_GT for encrypting messages and private key SK_GT for each node to decrypt ciphertext. If the connectivity of TS is not available, the LT will be applied to secure communication data in PSN. Each node generates local public key PK_LT and issues private key SK_LT to other nodes. In addition, we can use both GT and LT to secure communication data in PSN in a more secure way. In particular, the computation complexity of PSN message encryption is not changed with the maximum levels of GT and LT, which makes the scheme efficient and practical for communication data protection in PSN.
Different from previous work, our scheme adopts multidimensional trust levels to control communication data access in PSN in order to flexibly adapt to PSN topology changes and ensure PSN dependability. It is also very simple by comparing it with other ABE-based access control solutions since it only applies one type of attribute, trust, to secure PSN communication data for achieving high efficiency and advanced dependability. Furthermore, applying KP-ABE is more suitable than CP-ABE in PSN in terms of the communication cost of encrypted data packages. Specifically, the contributions of this article can be summarized as follows:
-We motivate securing communication data in PSN based on general trust and/or local trust in a flexible manner on the basis of KP-ABE. PSN communication data access can be controlled based on trust in either a centralized or distributed way or both. -We analyze the security of the proposed scheme and justify its performance through extensive analysis on its computation complexity, communication cost, scalability, and flexibility. We further compare its performance with our previous work that used CP-ABE (Yan and Wang 2017) to show its advantages. -We also develop a demo system based on Android mobile phones to show the practicability and real performance of the scheme.
We organize the rest of the article as below. Section 2 provides a brief overview of related work. Section 3 introduces the system and threat models and our design goals, followed by a detailed description of our scheme in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes and evaluates the performance of the scheme. Finally, a conclusion and future work are presented in the last section.
RELATED WORK

Pervasive Social Networking
There are many research activities related to social networking and computing. A number of recent studies focus on social communications in mobile domains.
In academia, social networking based on MANETs was investigated. Stanford MobiSocial Group developed Junction, which is a mobile ad hoc and multiparty platform for MANET applications (Junction 2018) . A Micro-blog (Micro-blog 2014) service helped users to post micro-blogs tagged by locations. ETHz Systems Group developed a pervasive social communication platform named AdSocial (AdSocial). Ott et al. analyzed a floating content concept based on a theoretical framework to study the fundamental quantities of an ephemeral content sharing service in opportunistic networks .
In industry, many companies conducted research in the area of PSN. For example, Intel Berkeley Lab conducted a project named Familiar Stranger based on mobile devices. It can extend our feelings and relationships with strangers whom we regularly observe but do not interact with in public places (Familiar Stranger 2013) . The EZSetup system developed by Microsoft Research Asia made a mobile user find services provided by his or her neighbors (EZSetup 2013) . Nokia Instant Community (NIC 2012) provided an instant social networking platform to allow people in the vicinity to communicate with, get to know, and share information with each other (Nokia Instant Community). But the above work in both academia and industry did not take social communication data security into consideration.
PSN Data Access Control
Data privacy protection and access control have been widely studied in the literature (Beach et al. 2009) . A common solution is data encryption (Chen and Faruq 2008) . The privacy issue of social networking was addressed in a number of applications through privacy setting configurations and execution of privacy policies defined by users. PeopleFinder allowed users to share their locations with others and refine privacy policies over time (Miluzzo et al. 2008) . In CenceMe (Miluzzo et al. 2008 ), a mobile social networking application using sensors, users can manually disable certain sensors in their mobile phones in order to preserve privacy.
However, existing work did not seriously consider trust, security, and privacy in PSN. Traditional centralized social networking systems (e.g., Facebook) cannot satisfy instant social networking demands, especially when users do not have an Internet connection, but with location proximity. Most existing systems have not taken user privacy and data security into consideration. They lack management on trust for the purpose of security assurance and privacy enhancement. Thus, it is hard for mobile users to accept PSN for performing official and crucial social communications that demand high security. In order to provide trustworthy pervasive social networking, we need to solve a number of issues with regard to trust, security, and privacy (Yan 2013) . Most previous work did not apply trust to control access to communication data in PSN, although trust is the basis for establishing a secure social networking environment (Yan and Wang 2017) .
Data access control with encryption only permits eligible users to decrypt data. The best way is to encrypt data once, distribute decryption keys once, and control each user to only decrypt its own authorized data. Considering the scenarios of PSN, the changes of network topology and user trust make key management complicated in order to achieve the expected level of security. Pure symmetric key encryption is not suitable because it is hard to support group social networking and manage keys in a distributed way. Data access control designed based on the symmetric key encryption to support various policies is neither flexible nor convenient. Public key encryption is not suitable for PSN either, especially in community-based instant social activities. The reason is that the public key encryption is not efficient for multicasting or broadcasting data to a group of users since data has to be encrypted by a data sender for each target receiver.
ABE-Based Data Protection in Mobile Networking
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) (Goyal et al. 2006; Bethencourt et al. 2007; Müller et al. 2008; Sahai et al. 2005 ) is a new cryptographic technique for data protection. In ABE, data is encrypted based on an attribute-based access structure, such that only the users whose attributes satisfy the access structure can decrypt the data. Access control identifies users based on a set of attributes rather than an exact identity. There are two branches in ABE (Goyal et al. 2006) : KP-ABE (Goyal et al. 2006 ) and CP-ABE (Goyal et al. 2006; Bethencourt et al. 2007) . CP-ABE encrypts data according to an access control policy, formulated as a Boolean formula over the attributes. In KP-ABE, a secret key is generated by associating it with a set of attributes, and thus it can decrypt the ciphertext if the attributes of the key owner satisfy a preapplied access structure. Recently, ABE has been applied to many areas, e.g., cloud data protection Wang et al. 2011) , secure vehicular ad hoc networks (Huang et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2016) , and wireless sensor networks and IoT (Chatterjee et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2014) .
However, ABE was seldom applied for securing PSN except in our previous work that uses CP-ABE (Yan and Wang 2017) . The main reason is the complexity of an ABE-based scheme, which makes its adoption by mobile devices challenging. The work presented in this article focuses on securing communication data in PSN based on trust by applying KP-ABE. To date, our scheme is one of the scanty holistic access control schemes to secure communication data based on trust in PSN. Figure 1 illustrates the system model of PSN. The system contains two kinds of entities: a TS that is trusted to provide identity management, key management, and trust management (the TS can evaluate the GT of a node accurately by collecting sufficient information) and the PSN nodes that interact with each other for pervasive social networking. Each node can collect local information in order to evaluate trust in other nodes, i.e., LT. It has functions and capabilities to manage LT, identities, and keys of other nodes. It is important to secure communication data in PSN because integrity and confidentiality of some social communications should be stringently ensured.
PROBLEM STATEMENT 3.1 System and Security Models
The nodes in PSN may not behave honestly, and thus cannot be fully trusted with each other. Some malicious nodes may eavesdrop on communication data to pursue personal benefits. Secure communications among trustworthy nodes in PSN are expected. Each node registers itself into the TS, and then the TS distributes a public key (PK_GT) to all nodes and issues a secret key based on the GT of each node. In addition, each node also has a public/secret key pair based on LT. The public key (PK_LT) of a node based on its current identifier is shared if needed for the purpose of authentication and secure communications. Since PSN nodes are mostly strangers, delegation is not allowed among them.
Additional assumptions based on previous work about trust evaluation in PSN Jiang et al. 2016 ) include the following: the TS knows each node's unique identifier and its pseudonyms. Each node reports its social networking records to the TS according to pseudonyms. Thus, it is possible for the TS to iteratively evaluate each node's general trust based on all collected information under a unique identifier. Social networking among nodes is performed based on pseudonyms in order to ensure node privacy. Each node can anonymously authenticate GT values of other nodes (Feng et al. 2017; Yan et al. 2016; Yan et al. 2014 ) and locally evaluate other node trust based on social networking experiences in an iterative way according to pseudonyms and GT. We further assume that each node has a unique identifier registered at the TS. The TS issues a number of certified pseudonyms to the node for it to selectively use during PSN communications. The pseudonyms issued to different nodes are different. Thus, the TS can match the node's pseudonyms to its unique identifier and make one node's pseudonyms different from those of another node.
Design Goals
To secure communication data in PSN, our design should achieve the following goals regarding security and performance: (1) security: communication data in PSN can only be accessed by eligible nodes that are trustworthy enough; the data access is controlled according to the GT evaluated by the TS or the LT evaluated locally by a node or both GT and LT; (2) personalization: the scheme allows each node to define its own policies to control its data access, e.g., setting up trust level threshold or specifying a trust level for guiding personal data access control; and (3) lightweight: the scheme should be lightweight with regard to computation and communication overhead.
SCHEME
We introduce a scheme to secure communication data based on two dimensions of trust in PSN. First, we describe the notations, preliminaries, and definitions related to the scheme. Then, we introduce the keys used in the scheme. Finally, we present the detailed scheme to control communication data access by applying KP-ABE in different scenarios.
Notations, Preliminaries, and Definitions
Bilinear pairing: Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups with the same prime order p, i.e., |G | = |G T | = p. Let д be a generator of G. A bilinear map e : G × G → G T has the following properties:
-Nondegenerate: e(д, д) 1 for generator д.
-Bilinear: for all r , s ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z p , e (r a , s b ) = e (r , s) ab . -Computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e (r , s) for any r , s ∈ G. Definition 1. General Trust level (GT ) is the trust level that is evaluated by the TS according to all accumulated social networking information based on a unique node identifier. Definition 2. Local Trust level (LT ) is the trust level that is evaluated by the PSN individual node according to the social networking information locally collected based on node pseudonyms.
The values of trust can be divided into discrete levels. We use дt_i to represent the ith level of GT, i ∈ (0, I дt ], where I дt is the maximum level of GT. Similarly, lt_i denotes the ith level of LT, i ∈ (0, I lt ], where I lt is the maximum level of LT.
Keys and System Setup
In system setup, TS generates public key PK_GT that is shared within all nodes and used by the nodes to encrypt and decrypt symmetric key DEK дt , a master key MK that is only known by TS. For each node u, TS generates its secret key SK_ (дt_u, u) , i ∈ (0, I дt ] based on дt_u, where дt_u represents u's general trust level. Symmetric keys DEK дt and DEK lt are randomly selected by a node to encrypt communication data (i.e., PSN messages) controlled by GT and LT, respectively. When TS is unavailable and nodes want to build up a secure session in a distributed manner, each node u generates public key PK_(LT , u) and personalized secret attribute key SK_ (lt_(u, u ), u, u ) , lt_(u, u ) ∈ (0, I lt ], where lt_ (u, u ) represents the local trust level of u evaluated by u, and SK_ (lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) is a secret attribute key of attribute LT issued to eligible node u by node u. Then, u issues SK_(lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) to node u . The secret key SK_ (lt_(u, u ), u, u ) is used in the decryption operation related to PK_(LT , u). 
PK_(LT , u)
The public key of LT generated by u
Encryption of symmetric key
The master key of node u about LT, which is only known by node u
The randomly selected symmetric key, whose access is controlled by LT
Encryption of PSN communication data
When TS is available, either GT or LT or both could be used for PSN data access control. Each node owns a pair of keys for controlling data access based on GT: PK_GT for encryption and decryption operations and SK_(дt_u, u) used to decrypt DEK дt . Corresponding to GT, DEK дt is used in symmetric decryption to get plain communication data. For attribute LT related to node u, public key PK_(LT , u) is generated by node u and used to encrypt DEK lt , aiming to control data access based on the local trust level evaluated by u. The corresponding secret attribute keys for decrypting the cipher-key encrypted by PK_(LT , u) are personalized for eligible nodes and issued by node u. To prevent collusion, every node u gets a different secret attribute key SK_ (lt_(u, u ), u, u ) that only it can use. In the case that both GT and LT are applied to control data access in PSN, the above keys are used in an integrated way; refer to Section 4.3 for details. The keys SK_ (дt_u, u) and PK_(LT , u) of node u are bound to its unique identifier, which can be a pseudonym. This binding is crucial for the verification of the node trust level. Similarly, SK_(lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) is bound to the unique identifiers of nodes u and u . Table 1 summarizes the keys used in the proposed scheme.
Scheme Algorithms
The proposed scheme contains a number of fundamental algorithms: IssueGeneralTrustPK, IssueGeneralTrustSK, CreateLocalTrustPK, IssueLocalTrustSK, Encrypt, and Decrypt. IssueGeneralTrustPK() . This algorithm chooses a bilinear multiplicative group G 1 of prime order p, selects д as the generator of G 1 , and generates a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . A security parameter k determines the size of the groups. It defines the universe of attributes U = (дt_1, дt_2, . . . ,дt_i, . . . ,дt_I дt ), where дt_i represents the ith level of GT, i ∈ (0, I дt ], and I дt is the maximum level of GT. For each дt_i, the algorithm uniformly randomly selects a number denoted t дt _i from Z p and uniformly chooses y at random in Z p . Then, PK_GT and MK are generated as below:
IssueGeneralTrustSK (PK_GT, u) . This algorithm is automatically executed by the TS whenever it is time to issue a secret GT key. Based on node u's GT, for instance, дt_u, it sets the access policy of node u: u can decrypt the ciphertexts encrypted by дt_i, where дt_i ≤ дt_u. It issues an access control tree T with root r . For r , it further sets a threshold value to be 1 and chooses polynomial q r with degree d r = 0 and sets q r (0) = y. Each leaf in tree T contains attribute t дt _i , where дt_i ≤ дt_u. The algorithm generates D i = д qr (0) t дt _i for leaf i with attribute t дt _i . The secret key is
CreateLocalTrustPK (LT, u) . This algorithm is executed by node u to control the access of its data (e.g., PSN chatting messages) in a distributed manner. The algorithm checks the LT-related policies. If this is the case, the algorithm outputs a public attribute key for the LT of user u, denoted PK_(LT , u), otherwise NULL. Similar to IssueGeneralTrustPK(), the algorithm chooses a bilinear multiplicative group G 1 of prime order p and selects д 1 as a generator of G 1 . In addition, it selects a bilinear map e 1 :G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . A security parameter k determines the size of the groups. We define the universe of LT attributes U = (lt_1, lt_2, . . . , lt_i, . . . , lt_I lt ); lt_i represents the ith level of LT, i ∈ (0, I lt ], where I lt is the maximum level of LT. For each lt_i, the algorithm uniformly randomly selects number t lt _i from Z p and uniformly chooses y ∈ Z p at random. Then, we have , u), u ,) . This algorithm is executed by node u. It outputs the secret key of node u , SK_ (lt_(u, u ), u, u ) . This process is executed by node u based on trust evaluation on u . Similarly, an access control tree T is issued with root r . For r , the algorithm sets a threshold value to be 1, chooses polynomial q r with degree d r = 0, and sets q r (0) = y . Each leaf in tree T has attribute t lt _i . D i = д 1 t l t _i is generated for leaf i with attribute t lt _i . Then, SK_(lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) can be generated as
IssueLocalTrustSK(PK_(LT
The generated key is sent to u by u through a secure channel, e.g., using RSA. For the data access controlled by GT, the Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms are described as below. Encrypt1 (PK_GT, gt_i, DEK дt , M) . The algorithm takes as input PK_GT , дt_i, DEK дt , and message M. It encrypts DEK дt with attribute дt_i and encrypts M with symmetric key DEK дt . It selects a random value s ∈ Z p and generates ciphertext CT дt as
Decrypt1 (PK_GT,SK_(дt_u , u) , CT дt ). The algorithm takes as input PK_GT , SK_ (дt_u, u) , and encrypted message CT дt . It decrypts CT дt with SK_(дt_u, u) and outputs plaintext M. This process is conducted at node u as follows: SK_(lt_(u, u ), u, u ) , and encrypted message CT lt . It decrypts CT lt with SK_(lt_ (u, u ) , u, u ) and outputs plaintext M at node u as below:
Y s . Then, we decrypt C lt with symmetric key DEK lt and get plaintext M. For PSN communication data access controlled by both GT and LT, the Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms are performed as follows.
Encrypt3(PK_GT, PK_(LT
. This algorithm takes as input PK_GT and PK_ (LT , u) , gt_i, lt_i, DEK дt , DEK lt , and M. M is encrypted by DEK дt and then DEK дt is encrypted with дt_i using PK_GT to output ciphertext CT 1 . Then CT 1 is encrypted with DEK lt , which is encrypted with lt_i using PK_(LT , u) to output CT 2 , as shown below:
Decrypt3 (PK_GT , PK_(LT , u) , SK_(дt_u, u) , SK_(lt_(u, u ) , u, u ), CT 2 ). This algorithm is executed by the node to decrypt the PSN communication data controlled by both GT and LT. It first calls Decrypt2 to decrypt DEK lt , then uses DEK lt to get CT 1 . Next, it calls Decrypt1 (PK_GT ,SK_(дt_u, u) , CT 1 ) to decrypt DEK дt , and finally uses DEK дt to get plaintext M.
Procedures
We illustrate the procedure of securing communication data in PSN based on trust in three cases:
(1) controlling communication data access with GT when the TS is available, (2) controlling communication data access with LT in a distributed way when the TS is not available, and (3) controlling communication data access with both GT and LT with the support of the TS.
Case 1: Secure PSN Communications with GT. In this case, node u wants to secure its communication data with other nodes based on GT. It generates DEK дt and uses PK_GT and SK_(дt_u, u) 9:10 N. Li et al. to encrypt and decrypt DEK дt , respectively. PK_GT and SK_ (дt_u, u) are generated by TS based on the general trust level of node u. Only the node with дt_u ≥ дt_i can decrypt DEK дt to get the plain PSN data. Herein, дt_i is a threshold defined in the access policy about GT for access control. Figure 2 shows the detailed procedure.
GT Related Key Generation:
-TS calls IssueGeneralTrustPK to generate PK_GT and MK. PK_GT is shared within all nodes; MK is kept by the TS only. When a new node joins the system, TS assigns it a unique identifier u, sends PK_GT to it, and initiates its GT value. -TS evaluates the GT of a node using the method proposed in and Yan et al. (2014) . -TS calls IssueGeneralTrustSK to generate SK_(дt_u, u) for eligible node u based on its GT and TS sends SK_(дt_u, u) to node u. -TS stores the node unique identifier u, and the current pseudonym applied by u, gt_u, and SK_(дt_u, u) in its database by attaching a valid period to them.
Secure PSN communications: Node u uses DEK дt to encrypt communication data M. It calls Encrypt1 to encrypt DEK дt with PK_GT and generates a message frame with a node pseudonym, Frame = {pseudo, CT }. It then sends the frame to other nodes in PSN. Once receiving the frame from a source node, a receiver node calls Decrypt1 to decrypt CT . Only those nodes with дt_u ≥ дt_i can decrypt DEK дt and get M.
Quit from PSN: A node may quit from the PSN at any time by informing the TS. The TS accepts this request and informs other nodes (e.g., by not issuing its GT token for node authentication (Yan et al. 2016) ). Later on, the TS will not send any new keys to it when its old keys expire.
Reissue GT keys: Due to node revocation and trust changes, related keys should be updated in order to ensure security. In this case, the TS periodically updates PK_GT and SK_(дt_u, u) as below:
-The TS checks the validity period of PK_GT .
-If it runs out, TS re-evaluates the GT levels of the remainder nodes. Case 2: Secure PSN communications with LT. In this case, a node wants to secure its communication data based on LT. It generates DEK lt and uses corresponding public key PK_(LT , u) to encrypt DEK lt . For eligible node u , u generates SK_ (lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) based on the trust level of u evaluated by u. SK_(lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) is used to decrypt DEK lt . Only the node with lt_(u, u ) ≥ lt_i (lt_i is the threshold defined by access policy regarding LT) can decrypt DEK lt and then get the plain PSN data, as shown in Figure 3 . The detailed procedure is similar to Case 1 except that the node itself handles PK_ (LT , u) and SK_(lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) generation, issuing, and revocation based on LT by calling CreateLocalTrustPK and IssueLocalTrustSK. Encrypt2 and Decrypt2 are applied in this case.
Case 3: Secure PSN Communications with both GT and LT. In this case, a node wants to secure its communication data based on both GT and LT. Node u generates DEK дt and uses PK_GT and SK_(дt_u , u ) to encrypt and decrypt DEK дt , respectively. Meanwhile, u also generates DEK lt and uses PK_(LT , u) to encrypt DEK lt . Eligible node u gets SK_ (lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) generated by u based on the LT of u evaluated by node u. The PSN data is encrypted by both GT and LT. Only the node with дt_u ≥ дt_i and lt_(u, u ) ≥ lt_i can decrypt DEK дt and DEK lt and then get the plain PSN data, as shown in Figure 4 .
The first step is the same as GT-related key generation as described in Case 1. LT-related key generation: The operation is executed at the node that wants to control PSN data access based on both GT and LT as below.
-Evaluate the LT of other nodes using the method proposed in and Yan et al. (2014) . -Call CreateLocalTrustPK to create PK_(LT , u) and IssueLocalTrustSK to generate SK_ (lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) for eligible node u based on its LT. Then, node u sends SK_ (lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) to node u . -Store the information about u , e.g., current pseudonym, lt_ (u, u ) , SK_(lt_(u, u ) , u, u ) in a light database by linking to a validity time period.
Secure PSN communications: Node u generates DEK дt and DEK lt . It encrypts communication data M by calling Encrypt3. Once receiving a data frame from a source node, a receiver node calls Decrypt3 to get plain communication data M.
Quit from PSN: A node may quit from the PSN at any time by informing TS. The TS accepts its request and informs other nodes. Later on, the TS will not send any new keys to it when its old keys expire.
Reissue GT keys: This step is performed in the same way as described in Case 1. Reissue LT keys: Node u periodically checks the clock, updates LT through local trust reevaluation, and regenerates PK_(LT , u) and SK_ (lt_(u, u ), u, u ) .
The new keys are applied once their validity period starts.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 5.1 Security Analysis
Fine-Grainedness of Access Control. The scheme can achieve fine-grained access control. The TS and nodes are able to define access policies and generate corresponding secret keys to control access to the encrypted data. Various factors that impact trust can be considered in the process of trust evaluation. The access policies can be flexibly defined based on GT and/or LT by the TS and PSN nodes. With this way, the scheme not only guarantees the fine-grained access control but also simplifies the attribute structure of the secret key by only considering the trust levels. Meanwhile, a data sender can set the data access privilege based on GT or LT or both according to the security demand of the data. Specifically, trust can be configured into different levels in different social networking contexts in order to realize context-aware data access control in PSN. For example, in the case that a person would like to send a message to his or her family that is not readable by college friends and vice versa a message to college friends that is not readable by family, our scheme can support this kind of practical demand by setting different community groups with different trust levels in different PSN communication situations.
Data Confidentiality. In the proposed scheme, data confidentiality is ensured by three data encryption algorithms, i.e., Encrypt1, Encrypt2, and Encrypt3. In all these algorithms, the PSN data first are encrypted using a symmetric key DEK s , and then DEK s is encrypted using our variant of KP-ABE algorithm. Assuming the symmetric key algorithm is secure, e.g., using a standard algorithm such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the data confidentiality of our proposed scheme merely relies on the security of our variant of KP-ABE algorithm. In Encrypt1 and Encrypt2, two KP-ABE algorithms constructed on independent group structures are used respectively, so the data confidentiality of Encrypt1 and Encrypt2 relies on their relevant KP-ABE algorithms. The KP-ABE algorithms used are the same as the algorithm in Goyal et al. (2006) , so the security of our scheme only based on Encrypt1 and Encrypt2 is provably secure under the attribute-based Selective-Set model given that the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem is hard.
In Encrypt3, we combine two KP-ABE algorithms together in order to achieve data access control based on both GT and LT. In what follows, we prove that Encrypt3 is as secure as Encrypt1 and Encrypt2, i.e., the KP-ABE algorithm in Goyal et al. (2006) . We sketch the security proof of our scheme based on Encrypt3 by defining three games as follows:
Game 1: This is the security game of our scheme based on Encrypt1. Game 2: This is the security game of our scheme based on Encrypt2. Game 3: This game is our scheme based on Encrypt3.
Proof: If there is a polynomial-time adversary A that wins the semantic security game of Game 3 under the attribute-based Selective-Set model with nonnegligible advantage ϵ, we can use it to build a polynomial-time simulator B to win the semantic security game of Game 1 and to build a polynomial-time simulator C to win Game 2. In the semantic security game, the adversary submits two equal-length challenge messages M 0 and M 1 . The challenger flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts M b . The challenge ciphertext is then given to the adversary. The adversary is asked to output his or her guess b ∈ {0, 1} of the random coin b. If b = b, the adversary wins. During the game, the adversary is given public parameters and allowed to issue queries for private keys for many access policies except the declared access policy the adversary wishes to be challenged upon. Assume the adversary A is able to win the semantic security Game 3 with nonnegligible advantage, i.e.,
5|, where SK j denotes the set of all the secret key queries. We build a polynomial-time simulator B to challenge Game 1 and a polynomial-time simulator C(CT lt , PK_(LT , u), SK j ) to challenge Game 2. In Game 1, simulator B gets ciphertext CT дt , which contains more ciphertext contents than CT 1 in Game 3, so simulator B's advantage is higher than ϵ. In Game 2, simulator C gets CT lt , which is the same as CT 2 except content (M ) DEK дt . Since simulator C has no knowledge of DEK дt , its advantage in Game 2 will not be affected by (M ) DEK дt . Therefore, the advantage of simulator C in Game 2 is the same as adversary A. Game 1 and Game 2 both are based on KP-ABE and are provably secure under the attribute-based Selective-Set model, and thus Game 3 is secure under the same model.
Performance Analysis and Discussions
Computation Complexity. We analyze the computation complexity of the following fundamental algorithms: IssueGeneralTrustPK, IssueGeneralTrustSK, CreateLocalTrustPK, IssueLocalTrustSK, Encrypt, and Decrypt. For the algorithms IssueGeneralTrustPK and CreateLocalTrustPK, their computation complexity is related to the input maximum level of GT or LT. These two algorithms execute one random generation operation (Rand) and one exponentiation operation (Exp) on group G 1 or G 1 for each GT or LT level (the level is linear from 1 to the maximum level). Moreover, an extra one random generation operation and one exponentiation are carried out to generate Y and Y . So the computation complexity of the two algorithms is O(I дt ) and O(I lt ), respectively.
For the algorithms IssueGeneralTrustSK and IssueLocalTrustSK, their computation complexity is related to the GT level or the LT level of the node. Suppose that the GT level of a node is N дt , N дt ∈ (0, I дt ], and N дt exponentiation operations are executed at the node. The computation complexity of the algorithm IssueGeneralTrustSK is O(N дt ). This is because the access tree contains a root and a number of N дt leaves. The algorithm generates D i = д qr (0) t дt _i for each leaf i with attribute t дt _i . The computation cost for each leaf is constant. Similarly, the computation complexity of the algorithm IssueLocalTrustSK is O(N lt ), where N lt represents the LT level of a node.
In Case 1, the main computation overhead of the encryption operation is the encryption of the message using DEK дt as well as the encryption of DEK дt using the Encrypt1 algorithm. The complexity of the former depends on the size of the underlying message and is inevitable for any cryptographic method. The algorithm Encrypt1 requires one random generation operation and two exponentiation operations on group G 1 , since we only use one attribute дt_i to encrypt DEK дt . So the computation complexity of the encryption operation is O(1).
For the decryption operation, the main computation is the decryption of DEK дt using the Decrypt1 algorithm and the decryption of the message using DEK дt . The complexity of the latter depends on the size of the underlying message and is inevitable for any cryptographic method. For the former, the computation contains two parts: traversing the access tree and one pairing operation (Pair). Thus, its computation complexity is O(1).
In Case 2, the encryption and decryption algorithms (Encrypt2 and Decrypt2) are similar to the relative algorithms in the case based on GT. The computation complexity of the encryption operation and that of the decryption operation are both O(1).
In Case 3, the main computation overhead of Encrypt3 consists of four parts: twice symmetric encryption with DEK дt and DEK lt and twice attribute encryption with дt_i and lt_i. Since the size of CT 1 is very small, about 270 bytes, the computation complexity of generating CT 2 mainly depends on the size of the PSN data. For each attribute-based encryption operation, it requires one random generation operation and two exponentiation operations in a group. Thus, the computation complexity is O(1).
In the Decrypt3 algorithm, first DEK lt is decrypted with SK_(lt_(u, u 1 ), and then CT 1 is gained with DEK lt . Further, DEK дt is decrypted with SK_ (дt_u, u) , and then the PSN communication data M is achieved with DEK дt . Since the size of CT 1 is small, about 270 bytes, the complexity of the symmetric decryption mainly depends on the size of PSN data, which is inevitable. For each attribute-based decryption operation, the computation contains two parts: traversing the access tree and one pairing operation on a group. Therefore, its computation complexity is O(1). Table 2 summarizes the computation complexity of each system operation in the proposed scheme and compares with our previous work (Yan and Wang 2017 ) based on CP-ABE.
Obviously, our scheme based on KP-ABE mainly costs in secret attribute key generation, which is related to the levels of the node's GT and LT. The scheme based on CP-ABE mainly costs in the encryption operation. We note that the secret key generation is mainly executed by a server with a strong processing capacity or by mobile PSN node devices, which is not performed frequently, while the PSN data encryption needs to be performed very frequently. Thus, the scheme proposed in this article can save a lot of computation costs compared with the work in Yan and Wang (2017) , 
Note: I дt : the maximum level of GT; N дt : the GT level of a node; I l t : the maximum level of LT; N l t : the LT level of a node; L: the number of conjunctions related to access policy L ≤ I дt × I l t . although the generation of the secret attribute key takes longer time. Thus, the proposed scheme is more suitable to be applied in many practical applications of PSN, e.g., social chatting and service inquiry. In these cases, the generation of the secret attribute key is not frequent, especially when a session of social networking has been built up.
Communication Cost. The size of ciphertext is an essential aspect with regard to communication cost. In the proposed scheme, the structure of the ciphertext is simple and the size is also reasonable, as shown in Figure 5 . CT can be either CT дt , CT lt , or CT 1 || CT 2 . If the size of symmetric keys is 128 bits and the length of PSN data is 1 byte, the size of ciphertext CT дt is about 298 bytes, as shown in Figure 8 . CT дt is lineally increased with the PSN data size. For the data access control based on LT, the size of ciphertext CT lt is the same as CT дt , while for the data access control based on both GT and LT, the ciphertext CT 1 keeps 270 bytes and CT 2 consists of three parts: the result of ABE, the symmetric encryption result of CT 1 , and the symmetric encryption result of PSN communication data M. The length of CT 2 is about 593 bytes if the PSN data size is 1 byte. CT 2 is also lineally increased with the PSN data size.
The communication cost of our scheme is small and acceptable. Additionally, we apply the access policy and trust evaluation to assist the decisions on the need for communications, key generation, and exchanges in order to minimize communication costs in various situations.
Scalability. In the proposed scheme, we concern multiple trust levels in the data access control. The result is that the computation complexity of encryption and decryption can be greatly reduced. The number of nodes in PSN does not impact communication data encryption and decryption, and thus the scheme supports scalability from the view of the size of PSN.
Our scheme is scalable for securing communication data to satisfy various access control demands in PSN with trust management support. We integrate trust evaluation into fine-grained access control in order to reduce the complexity of cryptographic computation. In the process of trust evaluation, we can take into account many complicated attributes that should be considered in the access control policy. Thus, our scheme can achieve sound operation performance and therefore is suitable to be applied into PSN.
The goal of scalability can be further supported because the complexity of each operation in the scheme does not depend on the number of nodes in the system, shown in Table 2 . The computation complexity of symmetric key encryption and decryption is O(1). Therefore, our scheme is ideal for securing communication data in PSN.
Flexibility. The proposed scheme can flexibly control communication data access in PSN in a centralized or distributed manner by adapting to the topology of PSN. The scheme supports data access control based on centralized trust evaluation or distributed trust evaluation or both in PSN. If a TS is available, we could use GT or both GT and LT to control data access. If not, LT can be applied for securing PSN.
Personalized Access Control. The scheme provides data access control in PSN with trust management support. It supports personal access control policies defined by each individual node. Each node can set its own data access policy (use different trust levels to control PSN data in different social networking contexts). The TS and the node itself manage the corresponding keys. The data access policy plays an important role in the design of general trust evaluation and local trust evaluation.
Demo Implementation and Performance Evaluation
We implemented the proposed scheme with C language based on the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC 2016) Library (Pairing Based Cryptography) on a workstation with Intel Pentium CPU G630 and 2GB RAM, running Ubuntu 14.04. Furthermore, we transplanted the core code of the scheme into Android mobile phones through a cross-compiler. Furthermore, we developed a demo system to demonstrate the applicability of the scheme. We adopted Android mobile phones (a ZTE v5 mobile phone and a Samsung GT-I9128 mobile phone are used in our demo) as PSN nodes and used a desktop workstation to serve as the TS. We also applied a second desktop workstation to play as a service provider to provide mobile services, e.g., hotel information provision. At system setup, the TS was initiated by generating a number of system credentials.
Operation Performance. We tested the operation time of the algorithms in our demo system. The implementation used a 160-bit elliptic curve group based on the super singular curve y 2 = x 3 + x over a base 512-bit finite field. As shown in Figure 6 , the GT public key generation time is lineally increased with the maximum level of GT. The GT secret key generation time is also lineally increased with the GT level of a node. The encryption time and decryption time based on GT is almost constant, which is not changed with the GT level of a node. Their operation time is about 6ms and 4.5ms, respectively, at the workstation with Intel Pentium CPU G630 and 2GB RAM, running Ubuntu 12.04.
We also tested the operation time of the algorithms related to LT in the mobile phone ZTE v5, as shown in Figure 7 . We observed that the LT public key generation time is lineally increased with the maximum level of LT. The LT secret key generation time is also lineally increased with the LT level of a node. We can see that the encryption time and decryption time based on LT is almost constant, which is not changed with the level of LT. The execution time is about 55ms and 60ms, respectively, in the tested Android phone. Due to limited computation capacity in the Android phone, the operation time of data encryption and decryption in the Android phone is about 10 times that in the workstation. But this fact did not impact user experiences very much. In the user test of our demo system, participants cannot feel any delay of encryption and decryption during chatting and service inquiry.
We tested the operation time of encryption and decryption based on both GT and LT in a service query initiated by the ZTE mobile phone and responded by the service provider server run in the workstation, as shown in Figure 8 . The PSN node user can control that only the services with sufficient levels of both GT and LT can access the service, and thus reply to a service query. Figure 8(a) shows the operation time of encryption in the Android phone based on both GT and LT. Because of its limited computing capacity, the total operation time is jittered, but keeps about 160ms as a whole. Figure 8(b) shows the operation time of decryption at the service provider server. We can see that the decryption time is almost stable, about 9ms in total.
The operation time we tested is consistent with our analysis of computation complexity. Due to limited computation capacity in the Android phone, it takes more time to run the algorithms in the Android phone than in the workstation:
Demo and Test. We developed an Android application to implement the functions of a PSN node that contains the following five modules, as shown in Figure 9 . 1. Registration: This module helps a PSN node device register into the TS. During registration, the TS initiates the GT of the device and records its information into the TS database. In our implementation, we set the maximum level of GT as 20. 2. GT Initiation: This module sends a request from a device to the TS in order to allow the TS to generate credentials for the device. After getting such a request, the TS checks the information of the PSN device and generates a secret key based on its GT. Then the TS sends the GT public key and the GT secret key to the device via a secure channel. 3. LT Initiation: This module initiates the LT keys for PSN node devices. It generates a public key of LT and issues corresponding secret keys to other nodes based on the LT information recorded in the local node device. We also set the maximum level of LT as 20 in the implementation. 4. Service: We implemented a service module to allow the PSN device to query and access various web services based on trust, e.g., hotel services, restaurant services, and mobile shops. A service query is encrypted with a policy related to trust levels (GT, LT, or both) as decided by the device user. After inputting the threshold access trust level (e.g., GT ≥ 5), the query will be encrypted. Then the device broadcasts the query to service providers. The services whose trust levels satisfy the access policy can decrypt the query and get the plain user request. Thus, it is possible for them to provide corresponding services. Only trustworthy services can be displayed in the screen of the PSN device. A user can click the URLs to access them. Figure 10(a) shows the user interface of the service module. A Figure 11 shows the service query result based on both GT and LT with the policy GT ≥ 5 and LT ≥ 10. Figure 12 shows the query result based on LT with the policy LT ≥ 5. 5. Chat: We also implemented a chatting room to demonstrate the scheme as well. In the chatting room, a device user can choose attribute GT or LT or both to control the access of chatting messages by clicking a button "Select mode" on the top left of the UI, shown in Figure 13 (a) and Figure 13 (b). The button "LT info" allows the user to see LT information of other nodes as shown in Figure 13 (c). The button "Policy" on the right of "LT info" makes the user able to set the access policy of chatting messages, shown in Figure 13 (d). The node device's GT level is displayed on the top right during chatting. Only those nodes whose trust is satisfied with the access policy can decrypt the ciphertext of chatting messages. Figure 14 (c) is the screenshot of phone B. In the shown example, A's GT is 10 and the message sent by A is controlled by GT with a threshold GT ≥ 10 at the beginning; B's GT is 15 and the message sent by B is controlled by GT with GT ≥ 1. At the beginning, messages sent by A can be displayed by B successfully because B's GT is 15, which is higher than 10. But when A set its access policy as GT ≥ 16, higher than B's GT = 15, the warning message "*** Your trust level is not sufficient for chatting message access! ***" is displayed by B. This test proves that the implemented scheme can control chatting messages based on the PSN user's access policy about trust.
We can see that the above demo illustrates the usage and applicability of the scheme. More application use cases can be supported by the scheme. Some examples are controlling the access of group chatting messages by trustworthy group members, location sharing with trusted friends, media sharing with a group of people in PSN, secure payment in PSN, and recommendation query to trusted people.
User Study. We further studied the user acceptance of our scheme through a small-scale user study. There were 10 participants (40% female) between 22 and 25 years old with different technical backgrounds participating in our experiment. We installed the demo system in the Android phones of all participants. After usage, each participant was asked to fill in a questionnaire designed based on the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) to provide feedback on perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, interface, playfulness, and acceptance attitude of the demo system. A 5-point Likert scale was applied. The interview result showed that our demo system achieved satisfactory evaluation scores with regard to perceived ease of use (AV E = 4.2, SD = 0.31), perceived usefulness (AV E = 4.4, SD = 0.38), user interface (AV E = 3.5, SD = 0.35), playfulness (AV E = 4.0, SD = 0.40), and attitude (AV E = 3.9, SD = 0.89). Based on the TAM, we can see that our scheme was welcome by the participants due to good user experiences.
DISCUSSIONS
We further discuss generality and limitation of the proposed scheme in this section.
Generality: The proposed scheme takes advantage of GT and/or LT to secure communication data and flexibly control data access in PSN in either a centralized or a distributed manner. It can protect PSN communication data in a pervasive way based on trust evaluation and management. It can easily secure group social networking by performing a group-based social trust evaluation. It can support specific communication requirements by embedding such requirements into trust evaluation and management. In addition, data confidentiality can be also considered in the justification of trust levels for the purpose of controlling data access based on the level of data confidentiality. Moreover, context information, e.g., location and time, can be taken into account in order to control data access with specific context constraints. For example, trust evaluation can be performed based on context requirements. Thus, it is possible for our scheme to support such cases where the relationships are ad hoc and one user would like to send a message readable by people around or by past contacts but by anyone with high enough global and/or local trust levels.
Limitation: This work is based on our previous results about trust evaluation in PSN (Yan 2013; Yan et al. 2014 ). At present, we perform trust evaluation according to the behaviors of PSN users and use trust as an attribute to secure and control communication data access. In PSN, context is linked to different social activities. Thus, a more sophisticated policy should be constructed based on context in PSN to achieve a more flexible and fine-grained data protection and access control. In future work, we will improve our scheme by taking context into consideration in both trust evaluation and data access control. Another line of research is to investigate a distributed trust evaluation scheme without any dependency on a centralized server.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we presented a scheme to secure communication data in PSN based on the general trust and/or the local trust in a flexible manner by applying KP-ABE. The scheme achieves controlling PSN data access based on trust either in a centralized or distributed manner. We analyzed the security of the proposed scheme under the existing security model and evaluated its effectiveness through extensive analysis on computation complexity, communication cost, scalability, and flexibility. We also compared its performance with our previous work using CP-ABE (Yan and Wang 2017) in order to show its suitability for PSN data protection due to its efficiency on communication data encryption. We further developed a demo system to evaluate its operation performance and illustrate the applicability and use cases of the scheme. The results show the correctness of theoretic analysis and the efficiency of the scheme for securing communication data in PSN in practice. For future work, we are going to apply the proposed scheme into more application scenarios in order to motivate its social acceptance and deployment and investigate a distributed trust evaluation scheme with context awareness.
